Seahawks vs 49ers Match Player Stats
The seahawks vs 49ers match player stats from the January 18, 2026, NFC Divisional Playoff game reveal how Seattle dominated San Francisco in a commanding 41-6 victory. The Seattle Seahawks controlled the scoreboard from the opening quarter, established a powerful rushing attack, protected the football, and created major problems for the 49ers’ offense. Kenneth Walker III delivered the standout individual performance with 116 rushing yards and three touchdowns, while Rashid Shaheed added a spectacular 95-yard kickoff return for a touchdown. On the other side, San Francisco struggled to turn its offensive possessions into points, despite contributions from Brock Purdy, Christian McCaffrey, and Jake Tonges.
This game was more than a lopsided postseason result. It demonstrated how rushing efficiency, field position, ball security, and defensive pressure can combine to determine a playoff matchup. Seattle did not need a high-volume passing performance to build a substantial lead. Instead, the Seahawks relied on an effective ground game, timely scoring plays, and a defense that limited San Francisco to six points. The statistics provide a useful way to understand why the game developed as it did and which individual performances had the greatest influence on the final score.
Seahawks vs 49ers Match Player Stats: Final Score and Game Summary
The NFC Divisional Playoff meeting took place on January 18, 2026. Seattle entered the game with a 14-3 overall record, while San Francisco came in at 12-5. The supplied ESPN UK box-score data records Seattle’s victory as 41-6.
NFC DIVISIONAL PLAYOFFS · JANUARY 18, 2026
Seattle Seahawks
41
14-3 entering game
San Francisco 49ers
6
12-5 entering game
Final result: Seattle won by 35 points.
The final margin reflected Seattle’s advantage across several statistical categories. The Seahawks scored in every quarter, accumulated 175 rushing yards, and recorded three rushing touchdowns. Their special teams also supplied a game-changing score through Shaheed’s long kickoff return.
San Francisco, meanwhile, finished with no passing touchdowns, no rushing touchdowns, and only two successful field goals. The 49ers generated 108 rushing yards, but their offense did not produce the explosive plays or scoring drives needed to keep pace.
Quarter-by-quarter scoring
| Quarter | San Francisco 49ers | Seattle Seahawks |
| First quarter | 0 | 17 |
| Second quarter | 6 | 7 |
| Third quarter | 0 | 10 |
| Fourth quarter | 0 | 7 |
| Final score | 6 | 41 |
Seattle’s 17-point opening quarter was especially important. It forced San Francisco to play from behind and increased the pressure on the 49ers to find more aggressive offensive solutions. San Francisco scored all six of its points in the second quarter but failed to add anything after halftime.
Seattle’s ability to score in all four quarters also prevented a late comeback from becoming realistic. The Seahawks added 17 points after halftime, while San Francisco remained scoreless during the final two quarters.
Key Player Statistics at a Glance
The following table highlights the individual performances that best explain the result.
| Player | Team | Key statistics |
| Kenneth Walker III | Seattle | 116 rushing yards, 3 rushing TDs |
| Rashid Shaheed | Seattle | 126 kickoff return yards, 95-yard TD return |
| Sam Darnold | Seattle | 12/17 passing, 124 player-row passing yards, 1 TD, 0 INT |
| Cooper Kupp | Seattle | 5 receptions, 60 receiving yards |
| Jaxon Smith-Njigba | Seattle | 3 receptions, 19 yards, 1 receiving TD |
| Brock Purdy | San Francisco | 15/27 passing, 140 player-row passing yards, 1 INT |
| Christian McCaffrey | San Francisco | 35 rushing yards, 39 receiving yards |
| Jake Tonges | San Francisco | 5 receptions, 59 receiving yards |
| Eddy Piñeiro | San Francisco | 2/2 field goals, 6 points |
| Devon Witherspoon | Seattle | 7 total tackles |
The passing figures above follow the individual player rows in the supplied data. Some individual passing totals differ from the corresponding team totals in the source, so they should not be treated as a reconciled statistical ledger. This distinction matters when comparing quarterback performance with team production.
Team Statistics: Where Seattle Created the Advantage
Individual performances explain part of the outcome, but the team numbers show why the gap became so large. Seattle was more efficient on the ground, produced more touchdowns, and benefited from a decisive special-teams play.
| Statistical category | Seattle | San Francisco |
| Final points | 41 | 6 |
| Passing completions | 12 | 17 |
| Passing attempts | 17 | 31 |
| Team passing yards | 106 | 128 |
| Yards per passing attempt | 7.3 | 4.6 |
| Rushing attempts | 33 | 27 |
| Rushing yards | 175 | 108 |
| Yards per rush | 5.3 | 4.0 |
| Rushing touchdowns | 3 | 0 |
| Receiving yards | 124 | 144 |
| Passing touchdowns | 1 | 0 |
| Interceptions thrown | 0 | 1 |
| Field goals made | 2 | 2 |
| Extra points made | 5 | 0 |
Source: supplied ESPN UK box-score data. Team and player passing figures contain discrepancies in the supplied text.
Three major differences stand out.
First, Seattle gained 67 more rushing yards despite attempting only six additional carries. That difference indicates better production per rushing attempt, not merely a greater willingness to run the ball.
Second, the Seahawks averaged 5.3 yards per carry, compared with San Francisco’s 4.0. Over an entire game, that efficiency can help an offense maintain possession, avoid difficult third-down situations, and create more opportunities to score.
Third, Seattle converted its offensive opportunities into touchdowns more effectively. San Francisco’s two field goals accounted for all six of its points, while Seattle combined passing, rushing, kicking, and a kickoff-return touchdown to reach 41.
Why the rushing numbers mattered more than passing volume
San Francisco recorded more passing completions and more team passing yards than Seattle in the supplied team totals. Yet those advantages did not translate into a competitive score.
This is a useful reminder that passing volume and offensive effectiveness are not the same thing. A team can complete more passes while struggling to generate touchdowns. Short completions can move the ball, but they do not always create the explosive gains or red-zone opportunities needed to win.
Seattle’s passing attack was more economical in terms of attempts. The team recorded 106 passing yards on 17 attempts, a listed average of 7.3 yards per attempt. San Francisco recorded 128 yards on 31 attempts, averaging 4.6 yards per attempt.
The distinction is important: Seattle produced more passing yards per attempt while leaning heavily on the running game. That balance gave the offense multiple ways to threaten the defense.
Kenneth Walker III: The Standout Performer
Kenneth Walker III was the central figure in Seattle’s offensive performance. He rushed 19 times for 116 yards and scored three touchdowns, averaging 6.1 yards per carry.
His production was significant in three ways.
- Volume: Walker handled 19 rushing attempts, giving Seattle a reliable foundation for its offensive game plan.
- Efficiency: His 6.1 yards per carry exceeded Seattle’s team average of 5.3.
- Scoring: All three of his touchdowns came on the ground, allowing Seattle to finish drives without depending entirely on passing touchdowns.
Walker averaged approximately 6.1 yards every time he carried the ball. Across 19 attempts, that level of production creates substantial pressure on a defense. Opponents must commit enough players to the run to prevent consistent gains, but doing so can create opportunities elsewhere.
How Walker influenced the game
A productive running back helps an offense in ways that extend beyond the number of yards gained. Successful runs can keep the offense ahead of the chains, reduce the need for long passing situations, and make play-action passes more credible.
Walker’s three touchdowns also gave Seattle a dependable method of finishing possessions. Rather than relying on multiple passing scores, the Seahawks were able to use their ground game to convert opportunities into points.
His 116 rushing yards represented roughly two-thirds of Seattle’s 175 team rushing yards. That calculation shows just how central he was to the team’s ground production.
Walker also recorded three receptions for 29 yards, according to the supplied receiving statistics. Combining his rushing and receiving totals gives him 145 yards from scrimmage. This broader measure captures his contribution as both a runner and a receiver.
What the numbers do not tell us
Box-score statistics cannot establish exactly how many yards Walker gained after contact, how often he made a defender miss, or how much of his success came from blocking assignments. Those conclusions require additional play-by-play data or detailed film analysis.
The figures do establish that he was highly productive and directly responsible for three Seattle touchdowns. That makes his performance one of the clearest individual explanations for the final margin.
Sam Darnold’s Efficient Passing Performance
Sam Darnold completed 12 of 17 passes, according to the supplied player statistics. His row lists 124 passing yards, one touchdown, no interceptions, a 110.9 passer rating, and a 63.1 QBR.
His completion rate was approximately 70.6%, calculated by dividing 12 completions by 17 attempts. That is a strong completion percentage for a game in which Seattle did not need to rely on high passing volume.
Darnold’s performance was notable for his decision-making as well as his production. The supplied statistics record no interceptions and two sacks for a loss of 18 yards. While sacks are negative plays, avoiding an interception helped Seattle retain control of its offensive possessions.
Understanding the quarterback statistics
Several measures are useful when evaluating Darnold’s performance:
- Completion percentage: He completed approximately 70.6% of his attempts.
- Passing touchdowns: He recorded one touchdown pass.
- Interceptions: He threw none, according to the supplied player row.
- Passer rating: His listed rating was 110.9.
- QBR: His listed figure was 63.1.
Passer rating and QBR are different measures. Passer rating uses passing outcomes such as completions, yards, touchdowns, and interceptions. ESPN’s QBR is a separate quarterback metric that evaluates contributions to a team’s performance using its own methodology. The two numbers should not be compared as if they were the same scale.
Darnold did not need to throw for several hundred yards to support a winning performance. Seattle’s rushing attack carried much of the offensive workload, while his passing efficiency helped keep the offense balanced.
One source detail deserves attention: the player row lists 124 passing yards, while the team passing total is 106 yards. Those figures do not reconcile. For accuracy, both should be understood as figures reproduced from the supplied source rather than independently corrected totals.
Brock Purdy’s Numbers and San Francisco’s Offensive Struggles
Brock Purdy completed 15 of 27 passes for 140 yards in the supplied player row. He threw no touchdowns and one interception, took two sacks for 16 yards, and recorded a passer rating of 54.6 and a QBR of 38.4.
His completion rate was approximately 55.6%. Although Purdy completed more passes than Darnold, his listed yards per attempt were lower: 5.2 compared with Darnold’s 7.3.
That contrast helps explain why completion totals alone can be misleading. Purdy’s 15 completions did not result in a passing touchdown, and San Francisco’s offense finished without a touchdown of any kind.
Where the 49ers’ passing game fell short
The supplied data points to several challenges.
Limited production per attempt. San Francisco averaged 4.6 yards per attempt in the team totals. That number suggests that the passing game generated relatively modest gains for the number of attempts used.
No passing touchdowns. Purdy did not throw a touchdown in the listed player statistics. The team consequently lacked a passing score to complement its rushing and receiving production.
Turnover problems. The player statistics record an interception and a lost fumble for Purdy. Turnovers can end promising possessions, reduce scoring opportunities, and give an opponent a chance to control the game.
Pressure and lost yardage. Purdy took two sacks for a combined loss of 16 yards. Sacks can turn manageable downs into difficult situations and disrupt an offense’s rhythm.
These numbers do not mean that every problem originated with Purdy. Quarterback performance is affected by pass protection, receiver separation, route design, defensive coverage, and the game situation. The available figures support a conclusion about the offense’s results, not a definitive judgment about every individual decision.
Mac Jones in the passing statistics
Mac Jones completed two of four passes for four yards in the supplied player row. He recorded no touchdowns, interceptions, or sacks in that line.
His contribution was limited in volume, so it would be inappropriate to make broad conclusions about his overall performance from four attempts. The small sample provides a record of his listed production rather than a reliable measure of his ability.
Christian McCaffrey’s All-Purpose Contribution
Christian McCaffrey remained one of San Francisco’s principal offensive contributors. He rushed 11 times for 35 yards and caught five passes for 39 yards.
His combined production was 74 yards from scrimmage.
| Category | Statistic |
| Rushing attempts | 11 |
| Rushing yards | 35 |
| Yards per carry | 3.2 |
| Rushing touchdowns | 0 |
| Receptions | 5 |
| Receiving yards | 39 |
| Receiving touchdowns | 0 |
| Combined yards from scrimmage | 74 |
McCaffrey’s receiving output helped him contribute even when the ground game was less productive. He caught five passes, matching Jake Tonges for the highest reception total among the listed San Francisco players.
However, his 3.2 yards per carry was below San Francisco’s team average of 4.0. That difference suggests the 49ers’ overall rushing total was supported by production from several players rather than McCaffrey alone.
McCaffrey also had no touchdowns in either the rushing or receiving categories. His all-purpose contribution was meaningful, but it did not overcome the team’s wider difficulty converting offensive possessions into scores.
For readers assessing his performance, the key distinction is between involvement and scoring impact. A player can touch the ball frequently and gain useful yards without generating the touchdowns that change a game’s outcome.
Jake Tonges Leads San Francisco’s Listed Receiving Production
Jake Tonges was the leading receiver by yardage in the supplied San Francisco statistics. He recorded five receptions for 59 yards on six targets, averaging 11.8 yards per reception.
His longest reception was 16 yards, and he did not record a receiving touchdown.
Tonges’ 59 yards represented a substantial portion of the 49ers’ listed 144 team receiving yards. His production offered a positive individual result in a game where the offense struggled to score.
San Francisco receiving statistics
| Receiver | Receptions | Receiving yards | Touchdowns |
| Jake Tonges | 5 | 59 | 0 |
| Christian McCaffrey | 5 | 39 | 0 |
| Jauan Jennings | 2 | 23 | 0 |
| Kyle Juszczyk | 1 | 11 | 0 |
| Jordan James | 1 | 7 | 0 |
| Brian Robinson Jr. | 1 | 3 | 0 |
| Demarcus Robinson | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Luke Farrell | 1 | 1 | 0 |
Kendrick Bourne and Ricky Pearsall were each listed with two targets but no receptions. These figures show why targets should not be confused with completed catches. A target records an intended passing opportunity, whereas a reception requires the pass to be caught.
The listed receiver rows also sum to 17 receptions, but their combined receiving yardage does not match the listed team receiving total. That inconsistency is retained from the supplied data and should be considered when interpreting the table.
Cooper Kupp and Jaxon Smith-Njigba Help Seattle Control the Passing Game
Seattle’s receiving production was spread across several players, even though the team attempted only 17 passes in the supplied statistics. Cooper Kupp led the Seahawks in receiving yards, while Jaxon Smith-Njigba supplied a receiving touchdown.
Cooper Kupp’s receiving performance
Kupp caught five passes for 60 yards on six targets. His average was 12.0 yards per reception, and his longest catch covered 21 yards.
Those numbers made him Seattle’s leading receiver by yardage in the supplied player statistics. Kupp’s five receptions also gave Darnold a reliable target while the offense continued to lean on Walker and the rushing attack.
His six targets resulted in five catches, meaning he converted approximately 83.3% of his targets into receptions. That percentage is a useful description of this particular game, although it should not be treated as a long-term measure of his ability.
Jaxon Smith-Njigba’s touchdown contribution
Smith-Njigba recorded three receptions for 19 yards and one touchdown on four targets.
His yardage total was smaller than Kupp’s, but his touchdown made his contribution particularly important. Receiving yards describe how much ground a player gained through catches, while touchdowns record the direct scoring result.
Smith-Njigba’s production illustrates why a receiving table should not be judged by yardage alone. A receiver with fewer yards can still have a decisive impact if a catch finishes a scoring drive.
Other Seattle receivers
| Receiver | Receptions | Receiving yards | Touchdowns |
| Cooper Kupp | 5 | 60 | 0 |
| Kenneth Walker III | 3 | 29 | 0 |
| Jaxon Smith-Njigba | 3 | 19 | 1 |
| Jake Bobo | 1 | 16 | 0 |
Jake Bobo caught one pass for 16 yards on one target. Rashid Shaheed and Robbie Ouzts were listed without a reception in their respective receiving rows.
The listed player statistics show a passing offense that distributed its opportunities without requiring one receiver to account for most of the team’s total production. The larger strategic advantage, however, came from combining that passing contribution with a strong ground game.
Rashid Shaheed’s 95-Yard Kickoff Return
Rashid Shaheed provided one of the game’s most memorable special-teams performances. The supplied statistics credit him with two kickoff returns for 126 yards, an average of 63.0 yards per return, and a longest return of 95 yards for a touchdown.
The return touchdown was a major contributor to Seattle’s final score. It also demonstrated how special teams can influence a game independently of the passing and rushing offenses.
Why the return was so important
A kickoff return can change a team’s field position immediately. Most offensive drives require multiple plays to move the ball toward the end zone. A return that covers 95 yards removes much of that distance and produces an immediate scoring opportunity.
Shaheed’s performance offered three benefits:
- It added a touchdown without requiring a conventional offensive drive.
- It gave Seattle a major gain in field position and scoring momentum.
- It increased the pressure on San Francisco to produce touchdowns of its own.
The final point matters particularly in a game with such a large margin. When one team receives points from special teams, the opposing offense has less room for error. Field goals become less helpful when the opponent is repeatedly finding the end zone.
Shaheed’s two returns averaged 63 yards, an extraordinary figure for a single game. It should be understood as a game-specific result, not a prediction of his usual return average.
Defensive Statistics: How Seattle Limited the 49ers
Seattle’s offense and special teams generated the most visible scoring contributions, but the defense also played an important role. The Seahawks recorded two sacks, seven passes defended, five quarterback hits, and one defensive touchdown in the supplied team statistics.
San Francisco’s defense also registered two sacks, showing that the difference in the final score cannot be explained by sack totals alone.
| Defensive category | Seattle | San Francisco |
| Total tackles | 66 | 60 |
| Solo tackles | 38 | 33 |
| Sacks | 2 | 2 |
| Tackles for loss | 4 | 6 |
| Passes defended | 7 | 0 |
| Quarterback hits | 5 | 3 |
| Defensive touchdowns | 1 | 0 |
These figures suggest different defensive profiles. San Francisco recorded more tackles for loss, while Seattle produced more passes defended and quarterback hits in the supplied data.
Tackles for loss can disrupt running plays and force offenses into longer down-and-distance situations. Passes defended can prevent completions or reduce the likelihood of explosive passing gains. Neither category tells the entire story, but together they provide a more useful picture than sack totals alone.
Devon Witherspoon’s tackling performance
Devon Witherspoon led Seattle’s listed defenders with seven total tackles, including three solo tackles. He also recorded one pass defended.
Tackles are a basic measure of defensive involvement, but they do not necessarily indicate how often a player made a decisive stop. A defender can accumulate tackles after a completed pass, while another can make an important play by forcing an incompletion without recording a tackle.
Witherspoon’s statistics establish his involvement in Seattle’s defensive effort. They do not, on their own, establish that he was the game’s best defender.
DeMarcus Lawrence creates pressure
DeMarcus Lawrence recorded three total tackles, three solo tackles, one sack, two tackles for loss, one pass defended, and three quarterback hits in the supplied data.
His combination of statistics is particularly informative because it goes beyond the sack column. Quarterback hits indicate that a defender reached or affected the passer, even when the play did not result in a sack. Tackles for loss can also indicate an ability to disrupt plays before they develop.
Lawrence’s listed production therefore reflects multiple types of defensive involvement. His three quarterback hits were especially notable in a game where San Francisco’s passing attack failed to produce a touchdown.
Seattle’s other defensive contributors
Ernest Jones IV recorded six total tackles and four solo tackles. He was also listed with one interception, although the supplied defensive team summary and player rows should be interpreted carefully because some source totals do not reconcile.
Drake Thomas recorded six tackles and one tackle for loss. Tyrice Knight had five total tackles, all listed as solo tackles, while Coby Bryant recorded four tackles and one pass defended.
Seattle’s defense did not need to rely on a single player for every important contribution. Its listed production included tackling, pass coverage, quarterback pressure, and turnover-related plays.
San Francisco’s leading defenders
Dee Winters led the 49ers’ listed defense with nine total tackles, five solo tackles, three tackles for loss, and one quarterback hit.
Eric Kendricks also recorded nine total tackles, including four solo tackles and one tackle for loss. Malik Mustapha recorded eight total tackles, one sack, one tackle for loss, and one quarterback hit.
C.J. West added a sack, a tackle for loss, and a quarterback hit. Despite those individual efforts, San Francisco’s defense allowed 41 points. That outcome reflects the full team result, including Seattle’s rushing touchdowns and kickoff-return score, rather than the performance of any one defensive player.
Turnovers and Ball Security: A Critical Difference
Turnovers are especially important in postseason football because every lost possession can remove a scoring opportunity and provide the opponent with a shorter route to points.
The supplied data lists three fumbles for San Francisco, with two lost. Seattle was listed with no fumbles and zero lost fumbles, while two fumbles were recovered by Seattle defenders.
| Turnover category | Seattle | San Francisco |
| Team fumbles listed | 0 | 3 |
| Fumbles lost | 0 | 2 |
| Interceptions thrown by the quarterback | 0 by Darnold | 1 by Purdy |
The individual fumble rows attribute a lost fumble to Brock Purdy and another to Jake Tonges. Kyle Juszczyk was also listed with a fumble that was not lost.
These turnovers matter because they interrupt offensive drives. A team that loses the ball may surrender a possession it had already worked to establish. The opponent may then receive an opportunity to score without needing to move the ball through an entire drive.
Seattle’s clean fumble record in the supplied data contrasts with San Francisco’s two lost fumbles. Combined with the interception listed against Purdy, the figures point to a significant ball-security problem for the 49ers.
There is an important limitation: the supplied data includes two Seattle fumble recoveries and an interception entry, but its turnover-related totals do not align perfectly across all fields. The player-level and team-level records should therefore be checked against the original play-by-play before using them for advanced turnover analysis.
The broader conclusion remains supported by the supplied game summary: Seattle protected its possessions more effectively, while San Francisco’s turnovers compounded an already difficult offensive performance.
Special Teams and Kicking Statistics
Special teams contributed directly to the scoring difference. Seattle recorded two successful field goals, five successful extra points, and a kickoff-return touchdown. San Francisco made two field goals but did not record an extra point because the supplied data lists no touchdowns for the 49ers.
| Kicking statistic | Jason Myers, Seattle | Eddy Piñeiro, San Francisco |
| Field goals made | 2 | 2 |
| Field goals attempted | 2 | 2 |
| Field-goal accuracy | 100% | 100% |
| Longest field goal | 31 yards | 56 yards |
| Extra points made | 5 | 0 |
| Points recorded | 11 | 6 |
Both kickers made all their listed field-goal attempts. Piñeiro’s longest field goal was 56 yards, compared with Myers’ 31-yard long.
The key difference was not field-goal accuracy. It was the number of touchdowns available for Seattle to convert into extra points. Myers’ five successful extra points followed Seattle touchdowns, while Piñeiro’s listed scoring came entirely from field goals.
Michael Dickson also recorded three punts for 149 yards, an average of 49.7 yards per punt. Two of those punts were listed inside the 20-yard line, with a longest punt of 54 yards.
Thomas Morstead recorded one punt for 51 yards for San Francisco. The 49ers’ single punt was listed as inside the 20-yard line.
Punting figures can help explain field position, but they do not establish how many points a punt saved or how effectively a team controlled possession. For that assessment, the punt locations would need to be considered alongside subsequent drives and starting field position.
Comparing the Quarterbacks: Darnold vs Purdy
A direct comparison of the two starting quarterbacks reveals different outcomes in efficiency, scoring, and turnovers.
| Statistic | Sam Darnold | Brock Purdy |
| Completions | 12 | 15 |
| Attempts | 17 | 27 |
| Completion percentage | 70.6% | 55.6% |
| Passing yards in player row | 124 | 140 |
| Yards per attempt in player row | 7.3 | 5.2 |
| Passing touchdowns | 1 | 0 |
| Interceptions | 0 | 1 |
| Sacks | 2 | 2 |
| Sack yards lost | 18 | 16 |
| Passer rating | 110.9 | 54.6 |
| QBR | 63.1 | 38.4 |
Darnold’s listed completion percentage was higher, his yards per attempt were higher, and he threw a touchdown without an interception. Purdy attempted ten more passes but did not record a passing touchdown and was charged with an interception.
The comparison does not mean Darnold had to outperform Purdy in every raw statistic to deliver the better game. Purdy’s player row lists more passing yards, but Seattle’s wider offensive production was more effective at generating points.
There is also an important difference in game context. Seattle established an early lead, allowing it to continue using a balanced attack. San Francisco had to respond to that deficit, creating greater pressure to find ways to score. Such circumstances can influence play selection, passing volume, and risk.
The fairest assessment considers the quarterback figures alongside the rushing totals, turnovers, and final score. By those measures, Seattle’s passing performance complemented a successful overall offensive plan, while San Francisco’s passing output did not generate the touchdowns needed to remain competitive.
What the Match Statistics Reveal About Seattle’s Game Plan
The numbers support several conclusions about how Seattle built its advantage. These are statistical interpretations of the supplied box score, not claims about unverified coaching instructions or specific plays.
1. Seattle had a more productive ground game
Seattle gained 175 rushing yards on 33 attempts, averaging 5.3 yards per carry. San Francisco gained 108 yards on 27 attempts, averaging 4.0 yards per carry.
The difference of 67 rushing yards gave Seattle a more productive foundation for its offense. Walker’s three rushing touchdowns made that advantage even more valuable because his yardage was accompanied by direct scoring production.
2. Seattle did not need a high-volume passing attack
Darnold attempted 17 passes in the supplied player statistics. Purdy attempted 27. Seattle’s offense nevertheless produced a much larger share of the game’s scoring.
This illustrates the value of offensive balance. A team that can run effectively does not need to depend exclusively on passing volume to generate points. Efficient passing can complement the rushing game without becoming the primary source of yardage.
3. Special teams created a separate scoring advantage
Shaheed’s 95-yard kickoff return gave Seattle a touchdown outside its conventional offensive production. That matters because a return score can change the scoreboard without requiring the offense to complete a series of passes or runs.
When evaluating a team’s overall performance, special teams should be treated as a distinct part of the game rather than an afterthought.
4. San Francisco’s scoring opportunities did not produce touchdowns
The 49ers’ listed scoring came from two field goals. They recorded no passing touchdowns and no rushing touchdowns.
The distinction between gaining yards and scoring points is central to understanding this result. San Francisco recorded 272 combined team passing and rushing yards in the supplied figures, but those gains did not translate into a touchdown. The figure is a simple sum of the listed team passing and rushing totals, not a separately verified total-offense statistic.
5. The early lead shaped the rest of the game
Seattle scored 17 points in the first quarter. San Francisco did not score until the second quarter, when it recorded six points.
A substantial early lead can change the incentives for both teams. The leading team may have more freedom to use a balanced attack, while the trailing team often has to prioritize scoring. That can increase pressure on the quarterback and make turnovers more damaging.
The quarter-by-quarter scoring supports the conclusion that Seattle established control early and maintained it throughout the game.
How to Read NFL Player Statistics Accurately
For readers researching individual performances, the following approach makes a box score more useful.
- Start with the final score and quarter totals. These establish when the game changed and whether either team mounted a comeback.
- Compare efficiency as well as volume. Passing attempts, completions, rushing attempts, and total yards are useful, but yards per attempt and yards per carry add context.
- Separate individual and team totals. A player’s statistics should generally reconcile with the team’s totals, but transcription errors and source discrepancies can occur.
- Distinguish touchdowns from yardage. A player who gains fewer yards can still have a greater scoring impact.
- Include turnovers and special teams. Fumbles, interceptions, and return touchdowns can change the result without appearing in ordinary passing or rushing comparisons.
- Check the original game record when precision matters. This is particularly important before publishing statistics in a database, statistical report, or betting analysis.
For the original game record, consult the ESPN UK box score for the Seahawks and 49ers matchup. It provides the appropriate starting point for checking the figures against the source presentation.
The supplied statistics contain discrepancies between some player-level and team-level totals. Those differences should be resolved against the original record before using the numbers in advanced statistical models or treating every total as independently verified.
Frequently Asked Questions
1. What was the final score of Seahawks vs 49ers on January 18, 2026?
The Seattle Seahawks defeated the San Francisco 49ers 41-6 in the NFC Divisional Playoffs. Seattle scored in all four quarters, while San Francisco recorded all six of its points in the second quarter.
2. Who had the most rushing yards in the game?
Kenneth Walker III led the listed rushing statistics with 116 yards on 19 carries. He averaged 6.1 yards per carry and scored three rushing touchdowns for Seattle.
3. How did Sam Darnold perform against the 49ers?
Darnold completed 12 of 17 passes. His player row lists 124 passing yards, one touchdown, no interceptions, a 110.9 passer rating, and a 63.1 QBR. The listed player passing yards differ from Seattle’s team passing total in the supplied data.
4. How many passing touchdowns did Brock Purdy record?
Purdy recorded zero passing touchdowns in the supplied player statistics. He completed 15 of 27 passes for 140 yards in the player row, threw one interception, and recorded a passer rating of 54.6.
5. Who returned a kickoff for a touchdown?
Rashid Shaheed of Seattle recorded a 95-yard kickoff-return touchdown. His listed total was two kickoff returns for 126 yards, averaging 63.0 yards per return.
6. Why did Seattle win by such a large margin?
Seattle combined a productive rushing attack, three rushing touchdowns, a kickoff-return touchdown, and effective scoring across all four quarters. San Francisco recorded no touchdowns and lost two fumbles in the supplied statistics. Together, these factors help explain the 35-point difference.
Conclusion
The Seahawks vs 49ers match player stats show how Seattle turned a strong all-around performance into a 41-6 playoff victory on January 18, 2026. Kenneth Walker III was the standout offensive player, finishing with 116 rushing yards and three touchdowns. Rashid Shaheed’s 95-yard kickoff return added another major scoring play, while Sam Darnold contributed an efficient passing performance with one touchdown and no interceptions in the supplied player statistics.
San Francisco had individual contributors, including Brock Purdy, Christian McCaffrey, and Jake Tonges, but the team’s offensive production did not result in a touchdown. Its two field goals were insufficient against Seattle’s combination of rushing scores, passing production, special-teams success, and defensive pressure.
The most important lesson from the numbers is that winning football requires more than accumulating yards or completing passes. Seattle was more productive on the ground, scored through multiple phases of the game, and avoided the fumble losses recorded for San Francisco. Those differences provide the clearest statistical explanation for the final margin.
